Effective Regulation of Public Utilities
This Court has never allowed rhetoric as a substitute for a record.
City of Charlottesville v. FERC, 661 F.2d 945, 954 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (declining to "take on faith" FERC's "trickle down" argument that "funneling" tax savings to shareholders will spur exploration and development)
Infrastructure, Market Structure, and Utility Performance: Is the Law of Regulation Ready?
Infrastructure, market structure, and utility performance: three challenges for regulators, each one a multidisciplinary puzzle. What role can law play in finding solutions? This speech addresses three main questions: (1) Infrastructure Investment: How Do We Ensure Sufficiency and Prudence? (2) Market Structure: How Do We Produce the "Best Possible Mix of Inevitably Imperfect Regulation and Inevitably Imperfect Competition"? and (3) Utility Performance: How Do We Define It? How Do We Induce It?
Paper published by the National Regulatory Research Institute.